

LIST OF DEATHS
POSITIVELY ESTABLISHED IN CONNECTION
WITH CIVIL DISTURBANCES IN
WASHINGTON, D. C. APRIL 5-7, 1968

About 6:10 p.m., April 5, 1968, Thomas Williams, male, negro, 14 years of age, of [REDACTED] was fatally shot in the left side of the chest with a pistol held in the hand of [REDACTED] male, white, 27 years of age, assigned to the Fourteenth Precinct of the Metropolitan Police Department.

Thomas Williams was pronounced dead at 7:00 p.m., April 5, 1968 at the D. C. Morgue.

[REDACTED] states, about 6:10 p.m., April 5, 1968, he observed several "looters" fleeing from the rear of the Young Men's Shop, 3942 Minnesota Ave., N. E. He states, he had an adult held at bay by gun point and at this time the decedent, Thomas Williams, raced past in front of him, striking his out-stretched hand, which was holding his service revolver. The pistol discharged striking the decedent.

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About 9:15 p.m., April 5, 1968, Ernest McIntyre, male, negro, 20 years of age, of [REDACTED] was fatally shot with the service revolver of [REDACTED] male, white, 25 years of age, assigned to the Eleventh Precinct of the Metropolitan Police Department, while fleeing the scene of a burglary at Al's Liquor Store, 4009 South Capitol Street.

Ernest McIntyre was pronounced dead at 10:55 p.m., April 5, 1968 at the D. C. General Hospital.

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About 11:00 p.m., April 5, 1968, Harold Bentley, male, negro, 34 years of age, an out-patient of the St. Elizabeth's Hospital, on authorized leave, was found in an unconscious condition, in the rear of 513 H Street, N. E., by a member of the D. C. Fire Department. Harold Bentley was pronounced dead at 11:45 p.m., April 5, 1968 at the D. C. General Hospital.

Investigation revealed the Fire Department had responded to the scene of a multi-alarm of fire and 513 H Street, N. E., a three story brick building, which was entirely "gutted", collapsed, roof and south wall, burying the decedent beneath them.

LOOTING - 8
RACIAL KILLING - 2

About 11:45 p.m., April 6, 1968, a negro male, not identified and designated John Doe "E", was found lying on the first floor landing near the loading platform of the looted G. C. Murphy Company, 3128 14th Street, Northwest by [REDACTED] male, negro, 27 years of age, of [REDACTED]

John Doe "E" was transported to the D. C. General Hospital and pronounced dead on arrival at 1:30 a.m., April 7, 1968.

[REDACTED] a Special Policeman, stated, he found the charred body of the decedent, while making a check of the G. C. Murphy, which had been the scene of a serious fire on April 5, 1968.

The body was clad in one size 7½ D shoe, white undershirt, white jockey shorts, brown socks and dark trousers.

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During the investigation of John Doe "E", ^F George Neely, male, negro, 18 years of age, of [REDACTED] and about 12:20 a.m., Sunday, April 7, 1968, was found in an unconscious condition in a second floor storage room of the looted G. C. Murphy Company, 3128 14th Street, N. W., by [REDACTED] assigned to the Homicide Unit, Criminal Investigations Division of the Metropolitan Police Department.

George Neely was transported to the D. C. General Hospital and pronounced dead at 1:30 a.m., April 7, 1968. Cause of death was burns.

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About 9:00 a.m., April 7, 1968, a negro male, not identified and designated John Doe "G", was found lying on the floor of the meat cooler of the looted Carolina Market, 1420 7th Street, Northwest by [REDACTED] male, negro, 31 years of age, of [REDACTED]

John Doe "G" was removed to the D. C. General Hospital and pronounced dead on arrival at 10:45 a.m., April 7, 1968.

The body was clad in dark navy blue overcoat, unbuttoned, a maroon shirt, black wool trousers, and black leather engineer type boots.

Cause of death - Smoke Inhalation; carbon monoxide poisoning.

Identified as **SETH HALE**, 42 years of age, of [REDACTED]

JAMES, Annie M., female, negro, 56 years of age, [REDACTED]
pronounced dead at 9:40 a.m., April 9, 1968.

About 6:30 p.m., Saturday, April 6, 1968, the above subject was removed from the home address, where she had been bed-ridden for six months due to an injured knee. She was evacuated from the house when the business establishment located at 1600 7th Street, N. W., [REDACTED] was set on fire by a group of persons whose identity are unknown. An autopsy was performed at the D. C. General Hospital and the cause of death was listed as pulmonary edema cause to smoke inhalation.

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JEFFERS, William P., male, negro, 40 years of age, of [REDACTED]
pronounced dead at 12:00 noon, April 14, 1968.

About 10:00 a.m., Sunday, April 14, 1968, the above subject was found in an unconscious condition, in the basement of the looted and burned Jan's Dry Goods Store, 1514 7th Street, Northwest, by [REDACTED] Truck #3, of the D. C. Fire Department.

The above subject was identified at the D. C. Morgue by his [REDACTED]

An autopsy was performed at the D. C. Morgue on Monday, April 15, 1968 and the cause of death is listed as thermal injuries, to be completed.

LIS' S OF DEATHS
PROBABLY/POSSIBILITY ESTABLISHED IN
CONNECTION WITH CIVIL DISTURBANCES
IN WASHINGTON, D. C., APRIL 5-7, 1968

Between 1:00 a.m., April 5, 1968, George M. Fletcher, male, white, 28 years of age, of [REDACTED] while in an automobile in company with three companions, was fatally stabbed in the top of the head by person or persons unknown.

Subjects drove to Virginia where they summoned an ambulance, which transported Fletcher to the Fairfax Hospital where he was pronounced dead on arrival at 2:40 a.m., April 5, 1968 by Dr. Phillip Azer of staff.

The location of this incident has not been found. Accordingly, this case is being carried in the category of possible.

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About 6:53 p.m., Friday, April 5, 1968, Ronald James Ford, male, negro, 29 years of age, of [REDACTED] was found in an unconscious condition, lying in the dirt area alongside the fence of the Cardozo High School, 2300 11th Street, Northwest, by [REDACTED] of the First Precinct, Metropolitan Police Department.

Ronald James Ford was transported to the Washington Hospital Center where he was pronounced dead on arrival at 7:10 p.m., April 5, 1968.

A trail of blood was found from a looted restaurant to where the decedent was found. This case is still under investigation and is being carried as probably incidental to the civil disturbances.

METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT

Washington, D. C.

Eleventh Precinct

April 16, 1968

TO: The Chief of Police

THRU: The Assistant Chief for Field Operations

ATTENTION: Deputy Chief, Commander, Patrol Division

ATTENTION: Supervising Inspector Third District

SUBJECT: A chronological report of events relating to disorders within the Eleventh Precinct beginning Thursday April 4, 1968, problems encountered, solutions utilized and recommendations.

THURSDAY, APRIL 4, 1968: Thursday began as a usual day in the Eleventh Precinct with the normal number of burglaries, robberies and other crimes reported. Business was usual and there was nothing noted that would give any indication of events to come. At 9:51 P.M., orders were received to hold the 4:00 P.M. to 12:00 section on duty. At 10:10 P.M., calls were started to notify the 12:00 midnight to 8:00 A.M., section to report for duty immediately. At 10:12 P.M., we began notifying all C.D.U. members of the precinct to report to the C.D.U. storeroom. These notifications were made relative to disorders which had begun in other sections of the city. At 11:59 P.M., twenty-three (23) members of the 4:00 P.M., section were sent to 14th and You Streets N.W. In addition, three scout cars from this precinct were sent to the northwest area. The conditions within the Eleventh Precinct remained normal and no unusual activity was reported.

FRIDAY, APRIL 5, 1968: At 12:48 A.M., notifications were started to call in all off duty personnel of the precinct. As these men arrived they were assigned to patrol the business areas of the precinct. At 3:40 A.M., the windshield in Scout 117 was broken by a large crowd in the 2300 block of 13th Street N.W. (#13 Precinct). At 5:05 A.M., all days off for members of this command were canceled. At 11:45 A.M., [REDACTED] Eleventh Precinct, injured his back while fighting a crowd of looters and maintaining an arrest at 13th and You Streets N.W. (#13 Precinct.) [REDACTED] was admitted to the Washington Hospital Center. At 12:00 Noon all members of this precinct were placed on 12 hour shifts. At 12:30 P.M., a large group of juveniles, (approximately 300) marched from Anacostia High and Kramer Junior High Schools to Minnesota Avenue and Pennsylvania Avenue S.E., where they held a memorial meeting for DR. KING. The meeting was peaceful and disbanded about 1:00 P.M. Small groups from this meeting began to drift

FRIDAY, APRIL 5, 1968 CONTINUED:

north into the Fourteenth Precinct and south into the Eleventh Precinct. Shortly after 1:00 P.M., calls for disorderly crowds were beginning to be received at the Eleventh Precinct. Crowds were gathering on Good Hope Road, Wheeler Road, Alabama Avenue and along Nichols Avenue. About 1:30 P.M., reports of window smashings and looting began coming in from areas of business over the entire precinct. Arrests for looting were made. About 6:00 P.M., the windshield of Scout 118 was smashed by a brick thrown at Nichols and Mount View Place S.E. By 7:00 P.M., illegal activity was increasing. Arrests for curfew violations were being made. At 7:55 P.M., Cruiser 23, operated by [REDACTED] was damaged in an accident while chasing looters in front of 2121 18th Street S.E. At 8:35 P.M., advance members of Engineer Troops from Fort Belvoir arrived. This first company of troops was immediately placed in critical areas of the precinct. About 9:00 P.M., first report of fire in shopping centers at 1000 Wohler Place and 4100 Wheeler Road S.E. came in. The fires were fought by fire companies from Maryland and Virginia. Both shopping centers were destroyed. About 9:10 P.M., fire was reported in the shopping center at 1300 Savannah Street S.E. which caused extensive damage. At 9:15 P.M., Ernest McIntyre, Negro male, 20 years of [REDACTED] was shot and killed by [REDACTED] when he was surprised looting a liquor store in the 4000 block of South Capitol Street. McIntyre had approached the officer in a threatening manner. At 9:45 P.M., [REDACTED] Negro male, 21 years of [REDACTED] was shot by [REDACTED] Eleventh Precinct, as he tried to run the officer down with an automobile at the scene of the looting of a liquor store at 2237 Minnesota Avenue S.E. [REDACTED] was treated at D.C. General Hospital, released and returned to the Eleventh Precinct. At 10:00 P.M., some unknown person threw a rock, breaking the rear window of Scout 112. The Scout Car was patrolling in the 3500 block of Wheeler Road S.E. At 10:30 P.M., [REDACTED] Eleventh Precinct, received broken fingers while chasing looters at 8th and Eye Streets S.E. (Fifth Precinct). At 11:30 P.M., arrangements were made to house the 82nd Airborne Division in Ballou High School.

SATURDAY, APRIL 6, 1968: At 2:00 A.M., a communications net was organized with the U.S. Army troops. All available members of this command with troops were patrolling the streets. A large number of curfew violators were being arrested. Many items of loot found on the streets were being brought into the station by troops and policemen. About 4:00 A.M., two separate reports were received of a Negro male in a light trench coat, pointing a rifle at troops stationed at 14th and Good Hope Road S.E. The entire area was searched with the help of a unit from C.D.U. Gas was used by C.D.U. on several vacant and condemned houses in the area but results were negative. Things became relatively quiet during the daylight hours of Saturday. At 7:15 P.M., [REDACTED] Eleventh Precinct, injured his back while unloading crates of tear gas at the Municipal Center.

SUNDAY, APRIL 7, 1968: At 2:00 A.M., [redacted] Eleventh Precinct, was injured by broken glass while chasing looters in the rear of 2757 Nichols Avenue. [redacted] received lacerations to the left forearm requiring 18 stitches. From this time until 6:45 P.M., the precinct was relatively calm. At about 6:50 P.M., an Army Jeep on patrol overturned at 2310 Skyland Place S.E. [redacted] 82nd Airborne Division was taken by helicopter to Walter Reed Hospital, condition critical.

MONDAY, APRIL 8, 1968: During the day troops patrolled the streets. Relative calm prevailed. At night the curfew was enforced with few violators. A few reports of looters were received. The evening and night were quiet and calm.

TUESDAY, APRIL 9, 1968: At 2:45 A.M., [redacted] Eleventh Precinct, while stationed at a roadblock at Suitland Road and Southern Avenue S.E., reported several sniper shots directed at him from a vacant building just across the district line in Maryland. [redacted] returned nine (9) rounds of fire. A thorough search of the area was conducted by Maryland and Eleventh Precinct officers and the results were negative. At 9:50 A.M., an Army tractor-trailer was damaged in an accident at Nichols Avenue and Portland Street S.E. There were no injuries. The remainder of the daylight hours were quiet. At 8:20 P.M., a rock was thrown through the right window of Cruiser 231 in front of 2753 Alabama Avenue S.E. The window was smashed and [redacted] Eleventh Precinct, received injuries to the face. He was treated at Cafritz Hospital and remained on duty.

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 10, 1968: At 12:10 A.M., Scout 116 was damaged in an accident at Stanton Terrace and Bruce Place S.E., while chasing a suspicious auto. The auto being chased was abandoned and the occupants escaped. It proved to be stolen. No other incidents reported this date.

THURSDAY, APRIL 11, 1968: The conditions in the precinct were calm. The 82nd Airborne Division began removing its troops and the D.C. National Guard began moving into the precinct. At 9:15 P.M., [redacted] Eleventh Precinct, after having made an arrest in the 2800 block of Knox Street, was surrounded by a large crowd which threatened the officer. [redacted] fired one (1) shot into the air which dispersed the crowd long enough for him to get to his scout car with the prisoner and leave the area.

FRIDAY, APRIL 12, 1968: At 4:00 A.M., the last curfew was lifted. Total curfew arrest had been 340 adults and approximately 150 juveniles. The day remained calm. By 11:50 P.M., this date the total number of adult arrests for all offenses since the start of the disturbance stood at 568.

SATURDAY, APRIL 13, 1968: Calm prevailed throughout the day. At 11:30 P.M., [redacted] white, male, 20 years of [redacted] reports while walking in the 800 block of Southern Avenue S.E., he was shot in the left shoulder by an unknown sniper. [redacted] could not tell if the shots came from an auto or one of the buildings in the area.

SUNDAY, APRIL 14, 1968: At 12:25 A.M., [redacted] white, male, 41 years of [redacted] while walking in front of his home, was attacked by three Negro males who stopped their auto when they saw him afoot. One of these subjects stated, "I haven't got me a white man since this riot". He then proceeded to stab [redacted] about the face and head with a knife. Condition serious and admitted to the hospital. At 1:05 A.M., a large furniture store at 1236 Good Hope Road S.E., was entered and a large quantity of TV sets were stolen. The store was then set afire causing extensive damage to the entire building. The remainder of the day was calm. As of 8:00 P.M., this date nineteen (19) business establishments had been destroyed by fire, ninety-eight (98) had been extensively damaged by looters. No homes or apartments had been destroyed by disturbance related incidents. The Fire Department was plagued Sunday evening by the sounding of ten (10) false fire boxes in the precinct.

MONDAY, APRIL 15, 1968: Monday was a quiet day. National Guard units assisted police in patrolling the streets. A series of false fire boxes was sounded in the early evening in the southern part of the precinct. The normal amount of crime was reported. There were no disturbance related incidents.

TUESDAY, APRIL 16, 1968: The operations of the Eleventh Precinct returned to normal. National Guard Units left the precinct about 12:00 Noon. Many business establishments that had been looted were opened again for business.

PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED

TRANSPORTATION OF PRISONERS

During the peak arrest periods there was a problem of transporting prisoners from the place of arrest to the Eleventh Precinct. Wagon #11 was frequently busy with runs to hospitals and headquarters. After the arrival of Army troops we utilized a large Army truck, Army jeep and one of our scout cars to operate as a unit designated "Wagon #17". This method supplemented regular wagon transportation.

PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED CONTINUED

HOLDING PRISONERS WHILE AWAITING BOOKING

During the peak arrest periods there was a large backlog of prisoners waiting to be booked. It was necessary to place these prisoners in the report writing room and other rooms in the station until they could be booked, searched and placed in the cellblock. A typewriter in the report room was damaged by unknown prisoners at one time when the room was packed with prisoners. About the third day we managed to get an Army bus with cage and bars on the windows which we parked directly in the rear of the station. All prisoners brought in were placed on this bus then brought into the station one at a time to be booked and processed.

BOOKING OF PRISONERS

Operating with one arrest book allows only one officer at a time to do the booking. This is a slow process in view of the information needed for the records and the reluctance of some prisoners to provide this information.

CURFEW PASSES

Many people were found on the street during curfew, who, because of the nature of their occupations or other situations, were allowed to proceed. Very few people holding curfew passes were encountered. Each officer stopping these people was left to his own discretion and common sense. With no uniformity, many persons claimed they were arrested at one roadblock after having been passed on at several others.

RECOMMENDATIONS

TRANSPORTING PRISONERS

I recommend that a number of Army trucks stationed in the Washington area be equipped with rear end gates and covered with wire making them suitable for transporting prisoners. At the first sign of civil disorder these trucks could be made available to the department. At least one truck should be made available to each precinct.

DETAINING PRISONERS AWAITING PROCESSING

I recommend a number of Army buses stationed in the area be equipped with cages and barred windows and that at least one bus be made available to each precinct for confinement of prisoners at the earliest sign of civil disorder.

BOOKING OF PRISONERS

I recommend that a system be established utilizing the present PD form #255 for booking purposes during times of mass arrests. As many officers as are needed could obtain information from prisoners and record the information by hand on Form #255. The prisoner could then be searched and placed in the cellblock. All 255 forms would be turned over to the station clerk for booking on the arrest book when time permitted. Case numbers could be entered on the 255 forms at the time the case is entered on the arrest book.

CURFEW PASSES

I recommend that curfew passes be issued beforehand to all persons who would qualify for being on the streets during curfew hours at a time of civil disorder. This would avoid a rush for passes at the time an emergency is declared. I recommend that Commanding Officers of Precincts be permitted to issue curfew passes to members of the Reserve Corps so they would be permitted to travel to and from the stations during a time of curfew.

CURFEW COLLATERAL

I recommend that a cash collateral be set for violations of curfew. Violators could be held until the curfew expires for that particular day then released upon posting a cash collateral.

RIOT HELMETS

I recommend that, for sanitary reasons and control purpose, each member of the Department be personally issued a riot helmet.


COVERALLS

I recommend that all members of the Department be issued coveralls as are used by members of the C.I.D. These coveralls are a practical uniform for civil disorder work and would save damage to regular uniforms.

BASEBALL TYPE GAS GRENADES

I recommend that a supply of baseball type gas grenades be kept at the precinct stationhouses. This grenade is simple to use and causes a minimum of injuries. Control could be maintained by an order issued setting forth the conditions under which they could be used.

This report is submitted in compliance with Teletype message #19-840.


Kenneth L. Knight
Captain
Commanding, Eleventh Precinct

GOVERNMENT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
Metropolitan Police Department

May 29, 1968

TO: The Chief of Police

THRU: Assistant Chief for Field Operations

ATTENTION: Deputy Chief, Commanding Patrol Division

SUBJECT: Report on the Disorders in Washington, D.C. commencing April 4, 1968

Assumed command of the Third Inspection District at approximately 2:30 A.M. April 5, 1968. Survey of conditions existing in the precincts comprising this district revealed that no looting, fires or other disorders had been reported on the evening of April 4th. Although a number of men and vehicles from the district had been deployed in other Sections of the City, conditions in the Third District remained normal.

12:00 Noon, April 5th -- Reported to the office of the Patrol Division commander. Discussed with the Assistant Superintendent of Schools the advisability of continuing the public schools in session until the normal dismissal time. I assumed Command of the Third Inspection District at about 1:10 P.M.. No incidents involved looting or burning in the district at this time.

About 2:00 P.M. the Third District Command Post was moved to the Eleventh Precinct on directions from the office of the Chief of Police because the Precinct Commander was on detail at Fort Gordon, Ga.. Upon arrival within the confines of the Eleventh Precinct it was noted that large crowds, mostly juveniles and young adults were roaming the streets. A number of people who had previously consented to serve as community relations volunteers began reporting to the Station house to receive instructions and arm bands. These persons were sent to business areas with the view of dissuading spectators and others to leave the streets. This effort proved ineffective. The police reserve Corps was also mobilized.

At approximately 3:00 P.M. I began touring the precinct to observe conditions. I responded to the 4100 block of Wheeler Road where a large group of juveniles and adults had gathered in front of the shopping area. A group of four special officers were on the scene. They were equipped with a shot gun and dogs. Spokesmen for the crowd objected vigorously to the presence of these men. The special officers were directed to leave the area. Leaders in the crowd made efforts to disperse the persons gathered there. Their efforts were partially successful.

About 4:00 P.M. the police radio began broadcasting many calls reporting looting and breaking of store windows throughout the precinct. I returned to the 4100 block of Wheeler Road to discover that looting had begun in that area. The metal grills had been removed from the store fronts and the windows broken. Two scout cars, each with 4 men were present and were making arrests. Successful efforts were made to disperse the crowd.

About 4:30 P.M. the stores in the 4100 Block of Wheeler Road were set on fire by persons unknown. Simultaneously with the disturbance on Wheeler Road business premises were being attacked in several other areas of the precinct and looting were mounting at a rapid rate. At this time relatively few incidents were reported in the 4th and 5th Precincts. Lootings and burning appear to have commenced in the 5th Precinct between 5:30 P.M. and 6:00 P.M.. Conditions remained near normal in the 4th Precinct throughout the period of disturbances.

I continued patrol, chiefly of the 11th Precinct, responding on calls and giving direction to patrolmen. I made repeated requests for Military personnel to be deployed in the 11th Precinct. Two cars from the 4th Precinct were deployed in the Eleventh Precinct.

About 7:00 P.M., April 5th, Cruiser #23 was involved in an accident with an auto operated by suspected looters. The looters escaped but the auto was taken into custody along with a large quantity of Whiskey. The Military arrived in the 11th Precinct and were deployed in critical areas. I estimate their time of arrival as 7:45 P.M. April 5, 1968.

In general military personnel were deployed in platoon units in five areas which had been subjected to the most severe looting and burning. Significantly, several areas, up to this time, had not been attacked by looters. These include the Fairfax Village section and the area around the Sears Roebuck Company at 28th and Alabama Avenue S.E.. After consultation with Military personnel, troops were deployed in these areas. Insofar as possible, police officers were deployed with the troops. The motorized units of the military were assigned to respond with scout cars on calls. This procedure proved to be effective in protecting business establishments which had been entered by criminals.

Enforcement of the curfew commenced shortly after the proclamation became known in the district. It was impossible to have effective enforcement without the assistance of the troops. Strict enforcement of the curfew commenced immediately. The troops arrived and continued throughout the critical period. The curfew proved to be one of the most effective weapons at the disposal of law enforcement.

Military personnel were finally deployed in the Fifth Precinct early on Saturday April 6th. Order was very quickly restored. Only scattered incidence of looting occurred.

Very little looting and vandalism occurred in the Fourth Precinct. However, the deployment of troops on Saturday in the Fourth Precinct, prevented severe looting from occurring there.

April 6th and the remainder of the emergency period was more or less stabilized because of the deployment of the Military in ample numbers. Many conferences were held with the military commanders in the three precincts along with the precinct commanders. Cooperation between police officers and the military was excellent at all levels. I personally received many favorable comments from military people regarding the conduct and caliber of our personnel.

Significant problems encountered during the period of the emergency

I concur with the captains of the 4th, 5th, and 11th Precincts that shortage of personnel was the most pressing problem. This involved the lack of sufficient personnel to protect premises and areas where windows and doors were broken or forced and a large quantity of merchandise still remained on the premises. This problem was most acute during the period before the deployment of the military personnel. The problem was adequately handled after the arrival of soldiers and marines. The handling of large amounts of property, the handling of juveniles and other prisoners presented a problem which was compounded by limited personnel. In both these areas the Reserve Corps rendered valuable assistance.

Some difficulties in the handling of large numbers of juveniles was experienced, particularly in the 5th and 11th Precincts. However the problem was rendered less acute by the utilization of the Reserve Corps. Without exception, the Reserve Corps of each of the three Precincts in the District performed outstandingly well. There was some reluctance on my part to authorize street duty for members of the Reserves because of personal risks to themselves. I later discovered that many of these men did perform duty on the street and were instrumental for alerting police officers when business places were attacked.

Equipment shortages were particularly acute. Many police officers were required to perform duty without helmets and gas masks.

Recommendations for changes in procedure, equipment etc. to Departmental effectiveness in the event of further disturbances

1. Riot equipment should be furnished each patrolman, this to include helmets, gas masks and riot batons.
2. Supply each precinct with a sufficient supply of tear gas.
3. Supply each precinct with a quantity of shot guns to be used in scout cars and on road blocks.
4. Provide each precinct commander a fund to be used for renting trucks for transportation of prisoners, providing food for the members of his command and for provident purposes.
5. The Patrol Division Commander, and the Field Operations Commander or their representatives should be available to the District Inspectors and the Precinct Commanders, at all times.
6. More training in riot procedures for as many of the members of the patrol division as possible.
7. Establishment of earlier Curfew.

Owen W. Davis
Inspector
Third District

METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT

WASHINGTON, D. C.

PRECLACT

April 16, 1968

TO: The Chief of Police

THRU: The Assistant Chief for Field Operations

ATTENTION: Deputy Chief, Commander, Patrol Division

ATTENTION: Supervising Inspector Third District

SUBJECT: Report on the Disorders in this city which began April 4, 1968 as required by Teletype Message 19-840.

1. A Chronological report of significant events relating to the disorders which occurred in the Fifth Precinct.

The problems and events which occurred in the city after the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King did not start in the Fifth Precinct or even take place until sometime after conditions were out of control in the Tenth and Thirteenth Precincts. I know this to be true because I surveyed the precinct in the scout car while listening to the radio. At 2:00 P.M., Friday, April 5, 1968, I, was with Governor Ronald Regan of California in the South East Enrichment Center, located 723-8th Street, S.E., where he was talking with Father Anderson and members of the neighborhood. The Governor finished his business and left the premise about 3:00 P.M. Although there were large numbers of young people on the street at this time there was no disorder. It was not until about 6:00 P.M., Friday, April 5, 1968, that policemen in the Fifth Precinct observed any real disorder. At this time five men were observed smashing the front show window to a Mens' Haberdasher store at 611 Pa Ave S.E. One of these men was arrested for Burglary 2 (case 1793), this being the first arrest relative to the disorder. The other men involved in this burglary escaped in an auto. Shortly there after at 6:32 P.M., the same happened to a Liquor Store at 7th and E Streets, S.E. The next place looted was Stans Discount Store at 545-8th Street, S.E., at 7:40 P.M. About the same time, 7:40 P.M., Friday, April 5th, the South East Uniform shop at 721-8th Street, S.E. was looted and a fire started which completely destroyed the building. Shortly there after two more fires were set, one at a gas station, the other a small store, but without too much damage.

From that time on till daylight, Saturday, the 6th, many stores were broken into and looted. The looting appeared to have little to do with the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King. It is my feeling that these persons were committing these crimes; arson, burglary and larceny, because there wasn't much chance of their being apprehended.

The Fifth Precinct was greatly hampered by the removal of three scout cars and their crews during the critical hours of this disorder. (Transferred to other precincts for duty with S.O.D.). The remaining scout cars had to respond on radio runs and give attention to special locations such as storage tanks of Washington Gas Company, and the Stewart Petroleum Company, the employees coming out of the House Office Buildings, Library of Congress, and etc. Our mobile units having to answer these assignments had little time to arrest or harass the looters, and our total command was not large enough to adequately patrol the many stores spread through out the precinct.

Each hour I was in touch with Inspector Owen M. Davis and other staff officials advising them of our precarious situation. About 5:30 P.M., Friday, April 5th, I was told by an Inspector that troops or a representative of them would arrive at the precinct by 7:00 P.M. After several other calls to headquarters and hours later, about midnight, General Haines and a police Inspector responded to the precinct. General Haines listened to the problems of the precinct and assured me that a company of Marines would be assigned to the Fifth Precinct. With the support of the Marine Company the disorder which had developed into an Army of destruction began to subside.

For the next several days with the Marines present, riding in our scout cars, patrolling in their mobile units, standing guard at important locations, we were again completely in control. The Marines and the policemen worked together harmoniously, as if they had trained together.

The Commissioner's Curfew on Saturday gave us a device to clear the streets of persons bent on creating disorder. We planned with the Marine officers to make this curfew effective and the results were amazing. We first had the curfew announced by the scout cars and the Marine sound truck in advance. Then ten minutes after the curfew we made up a procession of the sound truck, two marine troop, trucks covered with chicken wire, and two scout cars and toured the precinct.

Those persons on the street in violation were placed in the wire covered trucks visible to the public and also to the eighteen marines guarding them and at the same time supporting all police action. In our first night we arrested over a hundred violators. Each night we did this and the area afterwards was like a ghost town.

In the Fifth Precinct during the disorder I did not hear or know of any incident where violence or harassment against the police was committed. Not a single complaint was made of police or servicemen using excessive force. In fact I haven't received a complaint of any kind.

After Monday, April 8th, a second company of servicemen were assigned (U.S.Army) and later replaced by another company of National Guard service personnel. These men were badly needed to place guards on Government installations and critical locations in the precinct as a preventive measure. From the time the Marines reported to the precinct crime subsided and for the next week there were only isolated cases of looting and larceny.

2. A summary of any significant problems which developed together with any unusual procedures which were implemented.

The greatest problem the Fifth Precinct had was the shortage of personnel to handle this emergency situation. Officers would arrive on looting scenes with large hostile crowds making as many arrests as possible but would have to leave the scene to transport the prisoners to the precinct. After a short period of time these officers would return to the same location and take the looters by surprise and make more arrests. This was very effective. The scout cars we had were receiving emergency calls and could not spend time dispersing large crowds through out the precinct. The scout car loud speaker was used frequently and to some success in dispersing crowds.

A significant problem was the handling of large quantities of looted property that we recovered. We did not have any containers for this property or the personnel to properly handle it. To cope with this problem we obtained some trusted civilian persons who volunteered their services and placed them under the supervision of one policeman. These civilians tagged the property with the officers name and the defendant's name, tied it up and secured same in the basement of the precinct. They also stood guard over the property until we could ship it off to the property warehouse.

Another problem was the handling of large numbers of juveniles arrested by the Fifth Precinct. To cope with this problem we used police Cadets that were assigned to us. These young men worked continuously processing the #379 forms

and other paper work until the arrival of the Youth Aid Division.

Also a problem was the lack of equipment of all kinds. The Civil Disturbance Unit took our gas guns, tear gas and gas masks at the beginning of the disorder. There were also very few helmets available. This left us bare as to defensive equipment in the beginning and we had no outside help.

The number of injured prisoners coming to D.C. General Hospital was also a problem. The Admitting and Emergency Room was a busy place once the disorder started. We used Auxiliary Policemen and Civilians to help secure information and guard the many prisoners sent from every precinct.

We had a problem of getting food for the men who were working long and tedious hours. To cope with this the Fifth Precinct advisory council and local neighbors prepared food and brought it into the station. It would be recommended for the future that one hot meal each day be served, such as stew or soup.

A problem of transporting prisoners arrested in large numbers was experienced here. We over came this problem by using the Marine Troop trucks covered with chicken wire. This wire also prevented anyone being injured by rocks and bottles. These trucks were the greatest piece of equipment we had.

3. Recommendations for changes in procedures, equipment, or policies to improve departmental effectiveness in the future.

Have the Precinct Station House equiped with enough tear gas, tear gas guns, masks, riot helmets and batons for immediate use. Also each car should contain a shot gun and enough ammunition. The shot guns were very impressive and the show of these weapons made many touchy situations turn into a normal arrest. There should be more portable (hand carry type) spotlights with spare parts and batteries. We should have more flares and barricades available to set up road blocks or cordon off troubled areas.

Recommend a central location that is big enough to handle all our prisoners. The arrest team could take them to this location directly from the scene of arrest and turn them over with a form 255 (curfew violations, etc.).

This precinct had plenty of coffee and sandwiches but a system would be recommended where the officers could get one hot meal each day.

Have an extra wagon or truck that could be used exclusively for the transportation of female prisoners. Using our wagon to transport these women to the Womens Detention Center left us with no available unit for disorderly transports to the station.

We should make arrangements to have one or two officers take all the cases to court for the first appearance. All that is done the first time is to make the necessary papers and continue the case. We should not have to take too many of our working police off the street to go to court. We did this in the Fifth Precinct and had very few problems.

Have a supply of portable cardboard boxes in each precinct for processing of looted and recovered property.

The department should consider issuing each man coveralls to be kept in his locker in the precinct. This would save our uniforms from damage.

Daniel A. Hoadley

Daniel A. Hoadley
Captain
Commanding Fifth Precinct

E PATROL

